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Abstract—In this paper, the privacy and security issues asso-
ciated with transactive energy systems over insecure communi-
cations are addressed. In particular, it is ensured that, during
market-based interactions: (1) each agent’s bidding information
remains private; and (2) any extraneous data injection attack can
be easily detected. A unified cryptography-based approach that
can simultaneously achieve both objectives is developed, where
privacy preservation is realized by the Paillier encryption scheme,
and attack detection is achieved by the Paillier digital signature
scheme. Simulation results verify the effectiveness of the proposed
cyber-resilient design for transactive energy systems.
Index Terms—Transactive energy systems, privacy-preserving,
security-aware, cyber resilience, cryptography.
I. INTRODUCTION
Transactive control is now emerging from the electric power
system as a new type of control that incorporates economic
concepts and principles into the decision making and controller
design of individual entities of a system. Various transactive
energy systems (TESs) have been proposed to use the market
clearing prices for the coordination and control of distributed
energy resource (see, for example, [1]–[12]). However, the
market-based interactions between energy suppliers and cus-
tomers inevitably raise significant concerns of both privacy
and security. There are two different ways of obtaining the
market clearing prices including hierarchical and distributed
market clearing. The hierarchical market clearing, also known
as auction-based clearing, suffers from private information
leakage because individual market participants submit their
entire supply or demand curves (the relation between energy
price and supply or demand) to the coordinator, who can then
use them to infer the participants’ crucial private information,
e.g., business secrets or personal preferences. The distributed
market clearing is more privacy-aware than the hierarchical
one as individual participants only reports those points of their
supply or demand curves with respect to the prices broadcasted
by the coordinator, rather than the entire curves. However,
the coordinator could intentionally collect a large number of
points so that it can essentially recover the agent’s entire
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curve. We refer to the private information leakage problem
as the privacy issue. This issue has been identified in various
power systems. One example is the demand response problem,
in which each customer has to share its load decision with
others in order to find the optimal load [8]. However, the
load information could be private. It has been shown that
power load profiles at a granularity of 15 minutes may reveal
whether a child is left alone at home and at a finer granularity
may reveal the daily routines of customers [13]. In addition,
both approaches require information exchange between market
participants. If the communication links are insecure, then the
exchanged information could also be tampered by extraneous
data injection attacks. The market clearing price determined
based on the tampered information could extremely deviate
from the true clearing price and may lead to financial losses
or even market chaos. We refer to the information tampering
problem as the security issue. In power systems, the security
issue has been identified in, e.g., power market operations,
where attackers could deploy data injection attacks on line
flow sensors to make profitable market transactions and cause
financial losses to the social welfare [14]. Hence, The privacy
and security issues necessitate novel TES designs that can
execute transactive control while simultaneously protecting in-
dividual privacy and detecting malicious attacks over insecure
communication links.
Many techniques have been proposed in the literature to
protect data privacy in power systems. In [15] and [16], mutual
information has been used to define data privacy of smart
meters. This privacy metric quantifies the posterior information
entropy of private data given statistical models of source data
and auxiliary information and a protection scheme is usually
designed to minimize such posterior information entropy so
as to minimize information leakage. In [17] and [18], the
technique of obfuscation has been used to protect coefficient
privacy in centralized optimal power flow (OPF) problems
in cloud computing. The legitimate problem holder obfus-
cates the optimization problem by an invertible transformation
and sends the obfuscated problem to the cloud. The cloud
solves the obfuscated problem and sends the solution back to
the legitimate problem holder, who can retrieve an optimal
solution of the original optimization problem by inverting
the obfuscation transformation. Differential privacy has been
applied to OPF problems [19], [20] and economic dispatch
problems [21]. Differential privacy is a privacy notion origi-
nally proposed in [22] and [23]. Differentially private schemes
add random noises into individuals’ data in such a way that
individual participation cannot be inferred by an adversary
who can access arbitrary auxiliary information. There is a
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2fundamental utility-privacy tradeoff for differentially private
schemes due to the use of random noises [24]. Our recent
review paper [25] provides detailed comparisons of the afore-
mentioned three techniques and homomorphic encryption (to
be discussed soon) in the context of cyber-physical systems
(CPSs).
On the other hand, the technique of digital signature has
been broadly adopted by the communication community to
enhance security [26]–[28]. A digital signature is a mathe-
matical scheme that provides the message receiver a pair of
message and signature, such that the message receiver can
verify whether the message is tampered or not by checking
whether certain mathematical relation holds for the message
and the signature. Recently, digital signature has been applied
to enable secure communications in control problems [29].
In this paper, a cyber-resilient design is proposed for TESs,
which applies Paillier encryption and digital signature [30]
to address the privacy issue and security issues, respectively.
Paillier encryption is an additive homomorphic encryption
scheme. Homomorphic encryption is a cryptographic tech-
nique that allows certain algebraic operations to be carried
out on ciphertexts, thus generating an encrypted result which,
when decrypted, matches the result of operations on plain-
texts. An appealing advantage of homomorphic encryption is
that it can achieve perfect correctness in secure multiparty
computation, i.e., the computation process provides each party
the correct result of its target computation and meanwhile
does not disclose any information of its private data to any
other entity. Homomorphic encryption has been increasingly
used by the control community to achieve secure multiparty
computation in various control and optimization tasks, e.g.,
potential games [31], distributed optimization [32], quadratic
programs [33], linear control systems [34], [35], and consensus
[29], [36]. In power systems, homomorphic encryption has
been applied to various problems in smart grid, e.g., data
aggregation of smart meters [37], demand response and OPF
problems [32]. Because TESs involve multiparty computation
related to the coordination process, homomorphic encryption
is a good candidate to address its privacy issue.
Contribution statement. A scheme based on Paillier encryp-
tion is proposed to address the privacy issue. Each agent en-
crypts each sampled value of its supply or demand curve using
the coordinator’s public key and then sends the encrypted data
to a third party. The third party performs certain aggregation
operations over the encrypted data received from the agents
and sends the encrypted aggregated data to the coordinator,
who then uses its private key to perform decryption. By the
homomorphic property of the Paillier encryption scheme, the
decrypted data is just the aggregated sampled value. In the
above process, the coordinator only learns the aggregated
sampled value, but does not know individual sampled values.
Without knowing the coordinator’s private key, any other entity
cannot learn anything about the plaintext by observing the
ciphertext. After that, a block design is proposed to improve
computational efficiency. Roughly speaking, instead of han-
dling the sampled values separately, each agent concatenates
them to form a single number and all the cryptographic oper-
ations are only performed once for the concatenated number.
To guarantee decryption correctness, a padding scheme is
carefully designed for the concatenation. As a result, for the
same privacy level, the computational efficiency with the block
design is improved by the sampled value number times. Then,
the attacker model is extended to take into account the security
issue. A vulnerability analysis is first provided for the proposed
privacy-preserving algorithm. An attack detection mechanism
based on the Paillier digital signature scheme is proposed.
Whenever some data is to be sent over a communication link,
the sender first generates a digital signature for the data using
its own private key and then sends the data together with
its signature to the receiver. The receiver can then perform
a verification operation using the sender’s public key to detect
whether the received pair has been tampered or not. Without
knowing the sender’s private key, an attacker cannot generate
a pair that can pass the receiver’s verification. Possible re-
sponse strategies to mitigate data injection attacks are further
discussed. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed design is
verified via simulation on a residential air conditioners (ACs)
coordination problem.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides some preliminaries on Paillier encryption and Pail-
lier digital signature. Section III formulates the coordination
problem of TESs and identifies its privacy and security issues.
Section IV first develops a privacy-preserving algorithm based
on the Paillier encryption scheme and then proposes a block
design to improve computational efficiency. Section V further
develops an attack detection algorithm based on the Paillier
digital signature to address the security issue. Section VI
verifies the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms by a
residential ACs coordination problem. Finally, Section VII
concludes the paper.
A preliminary version of this paper is presented in [38].
Compared with [38], the current paper includes data injection
attack and proposes a security-aware mechanism, and develops
a block design that can improve computational efficiency.
Notations. Denote by R, R≥0 and N the sets of real, non-
negative real and natural numbers (including 0), respectively.
Given a positive integer n, let Zn = {0, 1, · · · , n − 1} and
let Z∗n denote the set of positive integers that are smaller than
and co-prime to n. Given positive integers x and y, denote by
gcd(x, y) and lcm(x, y) the greatest common divisor and the
least common multiple of x and y, respectively. Given x ∈ R,
denoted by bxc the greatest integer less than or equal to x.
Given x, y ∈ N, denote by x↔ y the concatenation of x and
y, e.g., 12↔ 345 = 12345. Given x ∈ N, denote by num(x)
the number of digits in x, e.g., num(123) = 3. Given x ∈ N
and two positive integers a ≤ b ≤ num(x), denote by [x]a:b
the part from the a-th digit to the b-th digit of x, with the first
digit being the leftmost one, and denote by [x]a:end the part
from the a-th digit to the last digit of x, e.g., [12345]2:4 = 234
and [12345]3:end = 345. Given a ∈ N, denote by (0 · · · 0)a the
concatenation of a zeros, e.g., (0 · · · 0)3 = 000.
II. PRELIMINARIES ON PAILLIER CRYPTOSYSTEM
In this section, we provide some preliminaries on Paillier
encryption and Paillier digital signature. More detailed discus-
sions can be found in [30].
3A. Paillier encryption
The Paillier encryption scheme is an additive homomorphic
encryption scheme. It consists of key generation, encryption
and decryption operations, as illustrated next.
• Key generation: A set of keys (α, β, ν, pi) is generated
by Algorithm 1, in which n is the security parameter to set
the key length, (α, β) are public keys and broadcasted, while
(ν, pi) are private keys and kept secret to the executor itself.
Algorithm 1: Key generation algorithm
Syntax: (α, β, ν, pi) = Algkey(n).
The executor randomly chooses two large prime numbers
p and q such that gcd(pq, (p− 1)(q − 1)) = 1 and
|α| = n with α = pq; computes ν = lcm(p− 1, q − 1);
randomly selects an integer β ∈ Z∗α2 such that the
following modular multiplicative inverse pi exists
pi =
(
(βν mod α2)− 1
α
)−1
mod α,
i.e., pi (β
ν mod α2)−1
α ≡ 1 mod α.
• Encryption: A plaintext pt ∈ Zα is encrypted as ct with
public keys (α, β) by Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Encryption algorithm
Syntax: ct = Algenc(α, β, pt).
The executor selects a random integer r ∈ Z∗α and
computes ct = βpt · rα mod α2.
• Decryption: A ciphertext ct ∈ Zα2 is decrypted as pt with
public key α and private keys (ν, pi) by Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: Decryption algorithm
Syntax: pt = Algdec(α, ν, pi, ct).
The executor computes pt = (ct
ν mod α2)−1
α · pi mod α.
The correctness, privacy and homomorphic property of the
Paillier encryption scheme are given as follows:
(i) Decryption correctness: Algdec(α, ν, pi,Algenc(α, β, pt)) =
pt.
(ii) Semantic security: If the decisional composite residuos-
ity assumption (DCRA)1 holds, then the Paillier encryption
scheme is semantically secure. That is, it is computationally
infeasible for one to infer any information of plaintexts by
observing the corresponding ciphertexts. In other words, the
Paillier encryption scheme does not disclose any information
of plaintexts.
(iii) Homomorphic property: Given any pt1, · · · , ptm ∈ Zα.
If
∑m
`=1 pt` ∈ Zα, then Algdec(α, ν, pi,
∏m
`=1 Algenc(α,
β, pt`)) =
∑m
`=1 pt`.
1DCRA: Given a composite C and an integer z, it is computationally
intractable to decide whether z is a C-residue modulo C2 or not, i.e., whether
there exists y such that z = yC mod C2.
B. Paillier digital signature
The Paillier digital signature scheme consists of key gener-
ation, signature and verification operations, as illustrated next.
• Key generation: Same as the key generation operation of
the Paillier encryption scheme.
• Signature: A pair of signatures (s1, s2) is generated for a
message m ∈ Zα2 with keys (α, β, ν, pi) by Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4: Signing algorithm
Syntax: (s1, s2) = Algsig(α, β, ν, pi,m).
The executor computes s1 =
(mν mod α2)−1
α · pi mod α
and s2 = (m · β−s1)1/α mod ν mod α.
• Verification: A triple (m, s1, s2) is verified with public
keys (α, β) by Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5: Verification algorithm
Syntax: FLAG = Algver(α, β,m, s1, s2).
The executor sets FLAG = 1 if m = βs1sα2 mod α
2,
and sets FLAG = 0 otherwise.
The security of the Paillier digital signature is illustrated as
follows: If the DCRA holds, then, after obtaining signatures to
any messages of its choice, an attacker cannot generate a pair
of signatures for a new message that can pass the verification
with non-negligible probability.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we first review the notion of TES and
two widely used market clearing approaches. After that, we
identify the privacy and security issues of the two approaches
and state our objectives.
A. Transactive energy systems
A TES consists of a set of distributed energy resources, e.g.,
smart loads, distributed generators, and even energy storage.
According to their roles in the TES, the participants of the TES
can be classified into three types: coordinator (CO), supplier,
and customer, where the coordinator is the market operator, a
supplier is an energy seller, and a customer is an energy buyer.
The TES can then be modeled as a multi-agent system with a
hierarchical structure, as shown in Fig. 1. The coordinator aims
to allocate energy resources to the suppliers and customers to
ensure both individual and social objectives and constraints.
This is referred to as the resource coordination problem. In
transactive coordination, the coordinator achieves the optimal
resource coordination by properly setting the resource price,
which is called the market clearing price. We next present a
typical TES to illustrate transactive coordination.
Denote by Vs and Vd be the set of suppliers and the set of
customers, respectively. Let Ns = |Vs|, Nd = |Vd|, and V ,
Vs ∪ Vd. In the remaining of the paper, when it is necessary
to differentiate between suppliers and customers, we will use
“supplier i ∈ Vs” or “customer i ∈ Vd”. Otherwise, we will
use “agent i ∈ V”.
4Fig. 1. Hierarchical structure of TES
Given a resource price λ, each supplier i ∈ Vs aims
to find an optimal supply that maximizes its profit, defined
as the earning in energy selling minus the cost in energy
generation. The profit optimization problem of supplier i ∈ Vs
is formulated as
max
psi∈Lsi
λpsi − Ci(psi )
where psi is its supply, Ci : R → R is its cost function, λ is
the resource price, and Lsi is the feasible set of psi .
Given a resource price λ, each customer i ∈ Vd aims to find
an optimal demand that maximizes its utility, defined as the
benefit in energy usage minus the cost in energy purchasing.
The utility optimization problem of customer i ∈ Vd is
formulated as
max
pdi∈Ldi
Ui(p
d
i )− λpdi
where pdi is its demand, Ui : R → R is its benefit function,
and Ldi is the feasible set of pdi .
The suppliers and customers take best response with respect
to the resource price given by the coordinator. The coordinator
then aims to select a resource price that maximizes the social
welfare. The bi-level optimization problem of the coordinator
is formulated as
max
λ∈R≥0
∑
i∈Vd
Ui
(
pd∗i (λ)
)−∑
i∈Vs
Ci (p
s∗
i (λ)) (1a)
s.t. ps∗i (λ) = argmax
psi∈Lsi
λpsi − Ci(psi ), ∀i ∈ Vs, (1b)
pd∗i (λ) = argmax
pdi∈Ldi
Ui(p
d
i )− λpdi , ∀i ∈ Vd, (1c)∑
i∈Vs
ps∗i (λ) =
∑
i∈Vd
pd∗i (λ). (1d)
In problem (1), the function ps∗i (resp. p
d∗
i ) is called the
supply (resp. demand) function, and its graphical representa-
tion is called the supply (resp. demand) curve, as shown in
Fig. 2 (resp. Fig. 3). Both hierarchical and distributed market
clearing approaches have been widely used to determine the
optimal solution λ∗ of problem (1). We next briefly discuss
these two approaches.
Fig. 2. Illustration of supply curve
Fig. 3. Illustration of demand curve
Hierarchical market clearing. Hierarchical clearing is also
referred to as the auction-based clearing. Each agent i ∈ V
submits its entire supply or demand curve to the coordinator.
Upon receiving all the individual supply and demand curves,
the coordinator determines the clearing price as λ∗ such that
(1d) holds, i.e., λ∗ is at the intersection between the aggregated
supply and demand curves, as shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Illustration of hierarchical market clearing
Distributed market clearing. Distributed clearing works in
an iterative manner. At each iteration k, the coordinator broad-
casts the price λ(k) to all the agents. Each supplier i ∈ Vs
(resp. customer i ∈ Vd) determine psi (k) = ps∗i (λ(k)) (resp.
pdi (k) = p
d∗
i (λ(k))) with respect to λ(k) and reports it to the
coordinator. Then the coordinator updates the clearing price
estimate for the next iteration until convergence is reached.
B. Cyber vulnerabilities
TES is a special class of CPSs, where the cyber space
determines market clearing prices and the physical world
5performs control tasks. Hence, TESs share the typical cyber
vulnerabilities of general CPSs. In this paper, we consider the
privacy and security issues existed in TESs. This subsection
identifies these issues in the two market clearing approaches
introduced above.
1) Privacy issue: In the hierarchical approach, the agents
submit their entire supply or demand curves to the coordinator.
With this information, the coordinator or an eavesdropper can
easily infer individual cost or benefit functions. In fact, the
inverse supply or demand function is just the derivative of the
corresponding cost or benefit function [39]. Hence, individual
cost or benefit functions can be recovered by integrating the
inverse of the corresponding supply or demand functions. This
could expose much about individuals’ business secrets (for
suppliers) or personal preferences (for customers). We refer
to the private data leakage problem as the privacy issue.
The distributed approach can partially mitigate the privacy
issue as the agents do not submit to the coordinator their
entire supply or demand curves, but only those required points.
However, the coordinator could make use of the iterative
nature of the distributed approach to intentionally broadcast
a large number of prices covering the whole admissible range
and obtains the agents’ responses. In this way, the coordinator
or an eavesdropper could recover the agents’ supply or de-
mand curves arbitrarily well by using, e.g., certain regression
algorithms in machine learning.
2) Security issue: Both approaches require information
exchange between the coordinator and the agents. If the com-
munication links are unauthenticated, extraneous attackers can
send forged information to legitimate participants or tamper
the information in transit to disrupt the market operation.
This is termed as data injection attack (also known as data
integrity attack or data tampering attack). In the presence
of such attacks, the data received by the coordinator could
be completely distorted, and the clearing price determined
accordingly could arbitrarily deviate from the true clearing
price and may lead to market chaos. We refer to the data
forging and tampering problem as the security issue.
C. Objectives
In this paper, we aim to develop a cyber-resilient algorithm
that simultaneously satisfies the following three properties:
(1) Correctness: The coordinator can determine the correct
clearing price λ∗ such that
∑
i∈Vs p
s∗
i (λ
∗) =
∑
i∈Vd p
d∗
i (λ
∗);
(2) Privacy preservation: After the execution of the algo-
rithm, for each supplier i ∈ Vs (resp. customer i ∈ Vd), no
other entity can infer the value of ps∗i (λ) (resp. p
d∗
i (λ)) for
any admissible λ;
(3) Security awareness: Any extraneous data injection at-
tacks can be detected by legitimate message receivers.
For the purpose of illustration, we will only consider the
hierarchical clearing. However, it is straightforward to extend
the proposed design to the distributed clearing.
IV. PRIVACY-PRESERVING DESIGN
n this section, the privacy issue is addressed by developing
a homomorphic encryption-based privacy-preserving design.
Fig. 5. Augmented TES framework
We first propose an implementation framework for practical
deployment to enable the use of homomorphic encryption.
Then we illustrate the attacker model adopted in this section.
After that, we present the privacy-preserving design for the
auction-based approach. Finally, we propose an enhanced
design that can significantly improve computational efficiency.
A. Implementation framework
A plain auction-based approach usually adopts the frame-
work shown in Fig. 1, where the coordinator collects individual
supply and demand curves and calculates aggregated supply
and demand curves to determine the clearing price. However,
the privacy concern requires that the coordinator should obtain
aggregated curves without knowing individual ones. In cryp-
tography, homomorpihc encryption is a promising technique to
fulfill this requirement. This technique requires that the entity
who receives individual ciphertexts and carries out algebraic
operations to be different from the entity who performs
decryptions. Hence, to enable the use of homomorphic encryp-
tion, we introduce an additional independent third party (TP)
as the entity who receives individual ciphertexts and performs
encrypted aggregations. The augmented framework is shown
in Fig. 5, in which we assume that there is a communication
link (i,TP) between each agent i ∈ V and the third party,
and a communication link (TP,CO) between the third party
and the coordinator. We note that the implementation of the
third party is flexible. It can be implemented by any supplier
or customer, or an extraneous entity, e.g., a cloud service
provider. Indeed, third-party cloud service has emerged in
power systems to support running large production workloads,
e.g., the IBM Power Virtual Server [40].
B. Attacker model
We assume that any market participant i ∈ V ∪ {CO,TP}
is semi-honest, i.e., it correctly follows the designed algorithm
but attempts to use received messages throughout the execution
of the algorithm to infer other participants’ private data ([41],
pp-20). The semi-honest attacker model has been widely
used in various applications, e.g., linear programming, dataset
process and consensus [42]–[44]. The communication links are
non-confidential and could be eavesdropped. An eavesdropper
6could be the third party, any supplier or customer, or an
extraneous entity. We assume that the coordinator is not an
eavesdropper and does not collaborate with any other entity.
This assumption is reasonable because the coordinator usually
represents a more authoritative entity, e.g., a government
agency, and cannot afford to get involved in a scandal of
eavesdropping individuals’ private information. In this section,
we assume that there are no data injection attacks. Such attacks
are considered in the next section.
C. Algorithm design
This subsection presents the proposed privacy-preserving
auction-based algorithm. We first make the following prepa-
rations. In reality, in plain auction-based clearing in Section
III-A, individual supply or demand curves are sampled and
discrete-valued versions are submitted. Denote by λmin and
λmax the lower and upper bounds of resource price, respec-
tively. Denote by τ the sampling period and Np the number
of sampled values, with Np = b(λmax − λmin)/τc. For each
supplier i ∈ Vs (resp. customer i ∈ Vd), denote by ps∗i` (resp.
pd∗i` ) its `-th sampled value, i.e., p
s∗
i` = p
s∗
i (λmin + `τ) (resp.
pd∗i` = p
d∗
i (λmin + `τ)). Denote by σ ∈ N the precision
level of the sampled values, i.e., for any ps∗i` and p
d∗
i` , only
the first σ decimal fraction digits are kept, while the rest are
dropped. Assume that the coordinator and all the suppliers
(resp. customers) know a strict upper bound δs (resp. δd) of
individual supply (resp. demand) curves, i.e., δs > psi for all
i ∈ Vs and all psi ∈ Lsi (resp. δd > pdi for all i ∈ Vd and all
pdi ∈ Ldi ).
Our privacy-preserving auction-based algorithm is based
on the Paillier encryption scheme. Recall that the sub-
algorithms Algkey, Algenc, and Algdec are standard Paillier
key-generation, encryption, and decryption algorithms, respec-
tively, and are given in Section II-A. The proposed algorithm
is presented by Algorithm 6 and informally stated as follows.
At step 1, the coordinator generates a set of keys by the
Paillier key-generation algorithm. The public keys are broad-
casted while the private keys are kept private to itself. The
bound on α is to guarantee decryption correctness. Roughly
speaking, to ensure decryption correctness, the public key
α must be larger than the computing result. Please refer
to the statement of homomorphic property at the end of
Section II-A, in which it requires α >
∑m
`=1 pt`. In our
problem, max{10σNsδs, 10σNdδd} is a strict upper bound
for all computing results, i.e., sampled values of aggregated
supply and demand curves. Hence, the bound on α guarantees
decryption correctness for all computing results at step 4.
Actually, for the sake of privacy, α needs to be very large,
e.g., in the magnitude of 22000 [45]. Hence, the upper bound
condition on α is usually automatically satisfied even if the
participants do not know δs or δd. At step 2, each supplier
i ∈ Vs (resp. customer i ∈ Vd) encrypts its sampled value
10σps∗i` (resp. 10
σpd∗i` ) by the Paillier encryption algorithm
with the public keys (α, β), and sends the ciphertext ysi`
(resp. ydi`) to the third party. Notice that 10
σps∗i` and 10
σpd∗i`
are both non-negative integers. At step 3, the third party
performs computations over received ciphertexts according to
Algorithm 6: Privacy-preserving auction
1 Key generation
The CO runs (α, β, ν, pi) = Algkey(n) such that
α > max{10σNsδs, 10σNdδd}, broadcasts (α, β) and
keeps (ν, pi) private to itself;
for ` = 1; ` ≤ Np; ` = `+ 1 do
2 Encryption
Each supplier i ∈ Vs runs ysi` = Algenc
(α, β, 10σps∗i` ) and sends y
s
i` to the TP;
Each customer i ∈ Vd runs ydi` = Algenc
(α, β, 10σpd∗i` ) and sends y
d
i` to the TP;
3 Computation over ciphertexts
The TP computes
ys` =
∏
i∈Vs
ysi` mod α
2
yd` =
∏
i∈Vd
ydi` mod α
2
and sends (ys` , y
d
` ) to the CO;
4 Decryption
The CO runs yˆs` = Algdec(α, ν, pi, y
s
` ) /10
σ and
yˆd` = Algdec(α, ν, pi, y
d
` )/10
σ;
5 Setting clearing price
The CO sets λ∗ = λmin + `τ such that yˆs` = yˆ
d
` , and
sends λ∗ to each agent i ∈ V .
the homomorphic property of the Paillier encryption scheme,
i.e., multiplication of ciphertexts provides an encryption of
sum of plaintexts. Hence, ys` and y
d
` are actually encryptions of
the `-th sampled values of the aggregated supply and demand
curves, respectively. The third party then sends ys` and y
d
` to
the coordinator. At step 4, the coordinator decrypts ys` and
yd` by the Paillier decryption algorithm with its public key α
and private keys (ν, pi), and transforms the decrypted results
back to real numbers via dividing them by 10σ . At step 5, the
coordinator sets and broadcasts the clearing price λ∗.
Algorithm 6 has the following properties:
(1) Correctness: For each ` ∈ {1, · · · , Np}, yˆs` =∑
i∈Vs p
s∗
i (λmin + `τ) and yˆ
d
` =
∑
i∈Vd p
d∗
i (λmin + `τ).
The correctness property states that yˆs` and yˆ
d
` are just the
`-th sampled values of the original aggregated supply and
demand curves, respectively. This property directly follows
from the homomorphic property of the Paillier encryption
scheme (please refer to the end of Section II-A). Since λ∗
is set as λ∗ = λmin + `τ such that yˆs` = yˆ
d
` , the correctness
property leads to
∑
i∈Vs p
s∗
i (λ
∗) =
∑
i∈Vd p
d∗
i (λ
∗). Hence,
optimal market-based coordination is achieved.
(2) Privacy preservation: If the DCRA holds, then, after the
execution of the algorithm, for each supplier i ∈ Vs (resp.
customer i ∈ Vd), for all ` ∈ {1, · · · , Np}, the value of
ps∗i (λmin + `τ) (resp. p
d∗
i (λmin + `τ)) is semantically secure.
The privacy preservation property directly follows from the
semantic security of the Paillier encryption scheme (please re-
fer to the end of Section II-A). Specifically, after the execution
of Algorithm 6, each agent i ∈ V only knows its own supply or
demand curve and the market clearing price; the coordinator
7only knows the aggregated supply and demand curves and
the market clearing price; the third party or an extraneous
eavesdropper only knows the market clearing price. Therefore,
any agent’s individual supply or demand curve is not known
to any other entity and privacy preservation is achieved.
D. A block design to improve computational efficiency
Algorithm 6 works in a point-wise manner, i.e., all the
cryptographic operations are performed for each sampled value
of the supply or demand curves. Specifically, each agent i per-
forms Np times encryption, the third party performs 2Np times
computation over ciphertexts, and the coordinator performs
2Np times decryption. When Np is large, the implementation
of Algorithm 6 would be time-consuming. In this subsection,
we propose a design such that all the cryptographic operations
are performed in a block-wise manner and the numbers of the
operations are independent of Np.
Roughly speaking, each agent concatenates all its Np sam-
pled values to form a single block, and all the cryptographic
operations are performed over the block. To guarantee correct-
ness, we propose to pad enough zeros in each sampled value
before concatenation. In this way, each agent performs once
encryption, the third party performs twice computation over
ciphertexts, and the coordinator performs twice decryption.
Hence, under the same key length, the computational com-
plexity reduces approximately by Np times. In the following,
we first use an example to illustrate the idea. After that, we
provide the design for the general case.
1) An illustrative example: For simplicity, we consider
the case of two agents, A1 and A2, and each Ai has two
sampled values, pi1 and pi2. The coordinator aims to derive
the sums p1 = p11 + p21 and p2 = p12 + p22. To achieve
computations of two sums at once, the rough idea is that
each Ai concatenates pi1 and pi2 as pi2 ↔ pi1, and, after
the cryptographic operations, the coordinator obtains (p12 ↔
p11) + (p22 ↔ p21). However, such direct concatenation
may not work since, in general, (p12 ↔ p11) + (p22 ↔
p21) 6= (p12 + p22) ↔ (p11 + p21). For example, assume
that p11 = 9, p12 = 17, p21 = 24, and p22 = 15. We then
have (p12 ↔ p11)+(p22 ↔ p21) = 179+1524 = 1703, while
(p12 + p22)↔ (p11 + p21) = 3233. To guarantee correctness,
we propose to pad enough zeros in each sampled value before
concatenation. Assume that it is known to all that pij ≤ 100
for each i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2. Then we have p1j + p2j ≤ 200
for each j = 1, 2. Hence, each p1j + p2j has at most three
digits. Each Ai pads zeros on the left-hand side of each pij
such that the padded number, denoted by p¯ij , has three digits,
and then concatenates p¯i1 and p¯i2. In the above example,
we have p¯12 ↔ p¯11 = 017009 and p¯22 ↔ p¯21 = 015024.
After the cryptographic operations, the coordinator obtains
p = (p¯12 ↔ p¯11) + (p¯22 ↔ p¯21) = 017009 + 015024 =
032033. The coordinator then cuts p from right to left every
three digits and sets p1 as the first cut and p2 as the second
cut, i.e., p1 = 33 and p2 = 32. (the leftmost zeros are dropped
after the cut).
2) General case: We next show the block design for the
general case and illustrate how to embed it into Algorithm 6.
At step 1, change the bound of α as
α > max
{
10Np×num(10
σNsδs) − 1
10num(10σNsδs) − 1 10
σNsδs,
10Np×num(10
σNdδd) − 1
10num(10σNdδd) − 1 10
σNdδd
}
.
Before step 2, individual suppliers and customers pad their
ps∗i` and p
d∗
i` as
p¯s∗i` = (0 · · · 0)num(10σNsδs)−num(10σps∗i` ) ↔ 10σps∗i`
and
p¯d∗i` = (0 · · · 0)num(10σNdδd)−num(10σpd∗i` ) ↔ 10
σpd∗i`
respectively, and then form the concatenation
p¯s∗i = p¯
s∗
iNp ↔ · · · ↔ p¯s∗i1
and
p¯d∗i = p¯
d∗
iNp ↔ · · · ↔ p¯d∗i1
respectively. After that, Remove the loop over sampled values
(i.e., remove the ` loop and drop ` from anywhere at steps
2–4). At step 2, replace 10σps∗i` and 10
σpd∗i` with p¯
s∗
i and
p¯d∗i , respectively. After step 4, the coordinator performs an
additional cutting step by setting, for each ` = 1, · · · , Np:
yˆs` = [yˆ
s](end−`×num(10σNsδs)+1):(end−(`−1)×num(10σNsδs))
and
yˆd` = [yˆ
d](end−`×num(10σNdδd)+1):(end−(`−1)×num(10σNdδd)).
V. SECURITY-AWARE DESIGN
In this section, the attacker model in the last section is
extended to include data injection attacks and equips an
attack detection mechanism for Algorithm 6 to further achieve
objective (3) stated in Section III-C. We first elaborate the
attacker model considered in this section and perform an
analysis on protection priority of the communication links
in our deployment framework. We then propose a digital
signature-based security-aware design. After that, we provide
possible response strategies to mitigate data injection attacks.
A. Attacker model
In this section, all the market participants V ∪ {CO,TP}
have the same attacker model described in Section IV-B. In
addition, there could exist extraneous attackers that launch
data injection attacks. In particular, they can send arbitrarily
forged information to legitimate participants or arbitrarily
tamper the information in transit. In this paper, we focus
on data injection attacks over communication links, but do
not consider Byzantine attacks, in which some legitimate
participants arbitrarily deviate from the given algorithm. We
leave the study of Byzantine attacks to our future works.
8B. Protection priority of communication links
In our deployment framework, there are three groups of
communication links: (1) the communication links (i,TP)
between the agents and the third party, over which the agents
send their ciphertexts to the third party (step 2); (2) the
communication link (TP,CO) between the third party and the
coordinator, over which the third party sends the aggregated
ciphertexts to the coordinator (step 3); (3) the communication
links (CO, i) between the coordinator and the agents, over
which the coordinator sends the clearing price to the agents
(step 5). In reality, due to limited budget, different com-
munication links usually have different protection priorities,
depending on their importance in the whole system. In our
problem setting, the protection priority of the communication
links is (TP,CO) > (i,TP) > (CO, i). The reason is as
follows. Attacks on (TP,CO) directly distort the aggregated
supply and demand curves arbitrarily, which could fail the
whole system. In contrast, attacks on some (i,TP) indirectly
affect the aggregated curves by arbitrarily distorting agent i’s
data, and the effects on the aggregated curves can be mitigated
by, e.g., dropping agent i at step 3. Further, attacks on some
(CO, i) only affect agent i’s local control task, but do not
affect the other agents. Moreover, since the clearing price is
public information, it is much easier for agent i to get its true
value even if (CO, i) is attacked.
Remark 5.1: Another communication in Algorithm 6 hap-
pens at step 1, where the coordinator broadcasts its public
keys. Notice that the key generation is only performed once
and can be done offline. In real-world applications, the public
keys are usually sent over authenticated links enabled by a
public-key infrastructure (PKI) [46].
C. Algorithm design
In this subsection, we present the proposed security-aware
design, which is based on the Paillier digital signature scheme;
please refer to Section II-B.
Consider the case where participant i aims to send a
message m to participant j via the communication link (i, j).
Assume that participant i has generated a set of Paillier keys
(αi, βi, νi, pii), where (αi, βi) are sent over an authenticated
link to participant j and (νi, pii) are kept private to itself. Par-
ticipants i and j perform an attack detection mechanism given
by Algorithm 7. The inputs include the identity indicators i
and j, participant i’s keys (αi, βi, νi, pii), message m, and an
index ` ∈ N. The outputs include a binary attack indicator
FLAG and participant j’s output message m¯. In particular, the
index ` is a stamp to identify which data m is. An example of
setting ` is given later. Recall that the sub-algorithms Algsig
and Algver are standard Paillier signature and verification
algorithms, respectively, and are given in Section II-B.
First, participant i generates a pair of signatures (s1, s2)
for ` ↔ m by the Paillier signature algorithm and sends
the triple (` ↔ m, s1, s2) to participant j. Upon receiving
the `-th triple (z¯, s¯1, s¯2) from (i, j), participant j performs
a verification operation to detect whether the received triple
has been attacked. The triple passes the verification if and
only if: (1) the triple (z¯, s¯1, s¯2) passes the Paillier verification
Algorithm 7: Attack detection mechanism
Syntax: (FLAG, m¯) = Algad(i, j, αi, βi, νi, pii,m, `).
Signature: Participant i runs (s1, s2) = Algsig(αi, βi, νi,
pii, `↔ m) and sends (`↔ m, s1, s2) to participant j;
Verification: On receiving the `-th triple (z¯, s¯1, s¯2) from
(i, j), participant j sets FLAG = 1 and
m¯ = [z¯]num(`)+1:end if Algver(αi, βi, z¯, s¯1, s¯2) = 1 and
[z¯]1:num(`) = `, and sets FLAG = 0 and m¯ = NULL
otherwise.
algorithm, and (2) the index matches, i.e., the first num(`)
digits of z¯ matches `. If the triple passes the verification, then
participant j sets FLAG = 1 to indicate no attack and sets
m¯ = [z¯]num(`)+1:end, which is just m. Otherwise, participant
j sets FLAG = 0 to indicate attack and sets m¯ = NULL.
The detection is enabled by the property that, without knowing
participant i’s private keys (νi, pii), an attacker cannot generate
a triple that can pass participant j’s verification. The index `
serves as the time stamp of message m. Without using the
time stamp, a verification with FLAG = 1 only indicates
that the received triple is or was generated by participant i.
However, this alone does not tell whether the received triple
is the current one. Indeed, an attacker could make use of this
fact to launch two attacks that cannot be detected. First, the
attacker could replace the current triple in (i, j) by a previously
observed triple that had been sent over (i, j). Second, if there
are multiple triples in (i, j) simultaneously, the attacker could
swap their orders in the link. In these two attacks, since the
replaced or reordered triple is a valid triple of message and
signatures, it can pass the Paillier verification algorithm Algver
and the third party cannot detect the attacks. However, with
the index `, these two attacks cannot pass the verification
operation in Algorithm 7, as a replaced or reordered triple
does not match the index.
To proceed, we illustrate how to integrate Algorithm 7 into
Algorithm 6. At step 1, each participant i ∈ V ∪ {TP,CO}
first generates a set of Paillier keys (αi, βi, νi, pii) by Algkey,
broadcasts (αi, βi) and keeps (νi, pii) private to itself. All these
key generation operations are only performed once. Without
loss of generality, we assume that all the public keys are sent
over authenticated links enabled by a public-key infrastructure
(PKI) [46]. Between step 2 and step 3, insert a step so that
supplier i ∈ Vs (resp. customer i ∈ Vd) as well as the third
party runs (FLAGsi`, y¯
s
i`) = Algad(i,TP, αi, βi, νi, pii, y
s
i`, `)
(resp. (FLAGdi`, y¯
d
i`) = Algad(i,TP, αi, βi, νi, pii, y
d
i`, `)).
If FLAGsi` = 1 (resp. FLAG
d
i` = 1), then the third party
adopts y¯si` (resp. y¯
d
i`) as y
s
i` (resp. y
d
i`) at step 3. Then,
between step 3 and step 4, insert another step so that the
third party as well as the coordinator runs (FLAGs` , y¯
s
` ) =
Algad(TP,CO, αTP, βTP, νTP, piTP, y
s
` , 2(` − 1) + 1)
(resp. (FLAGd` , y¯
d
` ) = Algad(TP,CO, αTP, βTP, νTP, piTP,
yd` , 2(`−1)+2)). If FLAGs` = 1 (resp. FLAGd` = 1), then the
coordinator adopts y¯s` (resp. y¯
d
` ) as y
s
` (resp. y
d
` ) at step 4. After
λ∗ is derived at step 5, the coordinator and each agent i ∈ V
run (FLAGi, λ¯∗i ) = (CO, i, αCO, βCO, νCO, piCO, 10
σλλ∗, i),
where σλ ∈ N is the precision level of price, i.e., for any
9price λ, only the first σλ decimal fraction digits are kept,
while the rest are dropped. Hence, 10σλλ∗ is a non-negative
integer. If FLAGi = 1, then agent i uses λ¯∗i as λ
∗.
The above attack detection mechanism guarantees that any
data injection attack can be detected by legitimate message
receivers. This property directly follows from the security of
the Paillier digital signature scheme and the usage of index.
D. Response strategies
This subsection suggests possible response strategies when-
ever it is detected that some data have been tampered.
The first attempt of the receiver should be to obtain the true
data via alternative communication channels, maybe under hu-
man supervision, e.g., via emails, phone calls, or even face-to-
face handshakes. We note that such alternative communication
ways should be subject to the real-time constraint. Since the
clearing price λ∗ is public information, the coordinator and
each agent who receives the true clearing price can broadcast
10σλλ∗ together with the signatures via public media, e.g.,
Internet or TV programs. Then an agent whose received
clearing price is tampered can access a broadcast media,
perform a verification to detect whether the triple on the media
has been tampered or not, and obtain the true clearing price
if the triple on the media passes the verification. The agent
can obtain the true clearing price as long as one accessible
broadcast media is not attacked.
In case that true data is not obtained in real-time, the
following mitigation strategies should be taken. If the link
(i,TP) is attacked, the third party, at step 3 of Algorithm
6, can instead use the most recent data from agent i that are
not tampered. Alternatively, the third party can view agent i
as an uncontrollable resource and remove it from market. If
the market is fully competitive, i.e., there are sufficiently many
agents participating the TES coordination, these two strategies
should barely affect the clearing price. If the link (TP,CO) is
attacked, the coordinator may have to completely abandon the
data from the third party, and continue the real-time market
coordination process by using the credible historical data. If
the link (CO, i) is attacked, agent i can instead use the most
recent received clearing price that is not tampered. Another
choice is to use the average of the clearing prices that are not
tampered received in most recent past cycles.
VI. CASE STUDIES
In this section, the proposed cyber-resilient design is tested
on a TES that coordinates and controls residential air condi-
tioners to manage the feeder congestion.
A. Simulation setup
We consider the real-time electricity allocation of a distri-
bution feeder on a hot summer day (August 16, 2009) for
Columbus, Ohio, USA. The weather data and the Typical
Meteorological Year (TMY2) data are adopted from [47]
and [48]. The wholesale resource price is adopted from the
PJM market [49] and it is modified to a retail rate plus a
retail modifier as defined by American Electric Power (AEP)’s
tariff [50]. We define this retail price as the base price. The
distribution feeder capacity limit is 3.5 MW. There are 1000
residential ACs under the feeder. In this scenario, the feeder is
both the coordinator and the only supplier, and each residential
AC is a customer. In each market cycle, the feeder aims to
obtain the aggregated demand curve and compares it with the
feeder capacity limit to determine the market clearing price. If
there is no congestion, then the clearing price is set to the base
price. If there is congestion, the clearing price is set as the price
corresponding to the feeder capacity limit on the aggregated
demand curve. The price range is between λmin = $0 and
λmax = $1 and the sampling period is τ = $0.01. We then
have Np = 101. The length of a market cycle is 5 minutes
and there are 288 market cycles in total for one day.
B. Simulation results
We simulate the above problem for a whole day. A second-
order equivalent thermal parameter (ETP) model [51] is used
to capture the load dynamics of the ACs. Detailed description
of the ETP model parameters can be found in [52].
We first verify the correctness and privacy preservation
properties of Algorithm 6 without data injection attacks. Fig
6 shows the evolution of feeder power within 24 hours. The
trajectory of feeder power with control (the solid blue line)
is derived under the proposed privacy-preserving algorithm.
Fig 6 verifies that our algorithm maintains optimal market-
based coordination. Fig. 7 shows the aggregated demand curve
at the 220-th market cycle (the number 220 is arbitrarily
picked and any other market cycle can be used for illustration).
Denote by pd∗(λ) the aggregated demand curve, i.e., pd∗(λ) ,∑
i∈Vd p
d∗
i (λ). We simulate the auction-based scheme both
with and without our privacy-preserving design and denote
the aggregated demand curves derived in the two cases by
pd∗privacy(λ) and p
d∗
plain(λ), respectively. In Fig. 7, the curve
pd∗privacy(λ) (the solid blue line) shows the shape of the aggre-
gated demand curve, and the curve |pd∗privacy(λ) − pd∗plain(λ)|
(the dot red line), which is constant at 0, shows that pd∗privacy(λ)
is exactly equal to pd∗plain(λ) at all values of λ, which verifies
the correctness of Algorithm 6. In Fig. 8, the left subfigure
shows agent 100’s demand curve at the 200-th market cycle,
and the right subfigure shows its encryption under 500 bits of
key length. Fig. 8 visually illustrates the privacy preservation
of Algorithm 6, as the points of the encrypted demand curve
look like pure random numbers within a large interval.
Next we verify the security awareness of the attack detection
mechanism in Section V. We deploy data injection attacks
to randomly picked half of the messages exchanged in the
100-th market cycle. To tamper a triple (` ↔ m, s1, s2), we
randomly choose a message m′ and generate a set of Paillier
keys, and use the keys to generate a pair of signatures (s′1, s
′
2)
for ` ↔ m′. The triple (` ↔ m′, s′1, s′2) is the tampered
version of (` ↔ m, s1, s2) and is sent over the underlying
communication link. In the simulation, for each unattacked
message, the verification operation returns FLAG = 1, while
for each attacked message, the verification operation returns
FLAG = 0. This verifies the effectiveness of our attack
detection mechanism in detecting data injection attacks.
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Fig. 7. Aggregated demand curve at market cycle 220
Finally, we examine the efficiency of the integration of the
proposed privacy-preserving and security-aware mechanisms.
Table I and Table II list the running time under different key
lengths without and with the block design in Section IV-D,
respectively. In both tables, the time for agent (column 2) is
the average time per agent per market cycle, and the time for
the third party and the coordinator (columns 3 and 4) is the
average time per market cycle. We can see that, under the
same key length, the running time with the block design is
much smaller than that without the block design. For large key
lengths, the rate between the running time without and with
the block design is approximately Np = 101, which matches
our expectation.
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TABLE I
COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY WITHOUT BLOCK DESIGN
Key length (bit) Agent (s) TP (s) CO (s)
500 0.58 11.97 0.53
1000 2.55 21.19 3.28
1500 7.61 26.57 10.02
2000 16.79 42.36 22.14
2500 32.70 70.03 42.79
3000 55.23 107.35 76.10
3500 87.51 157.78 114.63
4000 128.66 223.32 172.57
TABLE II
COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY WITH BLOCK DESIGN
Key length (bit) Agent (s) TP (s) CO (s)
500 0.016 0.12 0.010
1000 0.035 0.16 0.035
1500 0.089 0.27 0.11
2000 0.18 0.41 0.23
2500 0.34 0.71 0.44
3000 0.58 1.09 0.76
3500 0.88 1.61 1.20
4000 1.40 2.34 1.96
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper studied the privacy and security issues associated
with TESs. We first focused on the privacy issue by developing
a homomorphic encryption-based algorithm to simultaneously
achieve the optimal market-based coordination and privacy
preservation. A block design was proposed to greatly improve
the associated computational efficiency. Then, we moved to the
security issue and proposed a digital signature-based mecha-
nism that further ensures security awareness. The effectiveness
of the proposed cyber-resilient TES design was verified by
simulations on the transactive control of residential ACs.
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